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Building upon established theories, the Dynamic Capabilities view emerged as an attempt to 
extent existing theories on how companies can address rapidly changing environments. 
Defined by Teece et al. (1997) as a firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal 
and external competencies, Barreto (2000) suggests a new conceptualization of Dynamic 
Capabilities, presenting them as a four dimension construct.  
In this dissertation, I have chosen to develop a teaching case which aims to illustrate the 
fundamentals of the Dynamic Capabilities theory and its real-life implications. The company I 
have selected for this matter is Germany-based Bayer, who acquired American-based 
Monsanto in June 2018.  
In literature, acquisitions are often classified as a strategic action, executed by a company to 
modify its distinctive competencies in order to keep up with changing environments. The case 
indents to assess the underlying reasons of Bayer’s decision to acquire the seed manufacturer 
and which opportunities and threats had been tied to the union. It further paints a picture of the 
future of the Agricultural sector and how the profound consolidation, in the years between 
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Com base em teorias existentes, o conceito das Dynamic Capabilities surgiu como uma 
tentativa de abordar a forma como as empresas podem lidar com ambientes em rápida mudança. 
Definidas por Teece et al. (1997) como a capacidade de uma empresa integrar, construir e 
reorganizar as suas competências internas e externas, Barreto (2010) sugere um novo conceito 
de Dynamic Capabilities, apresentando-as como um framework com quatro dimensões. 
 
Nesta dissertação, decidi desenvolver um caso que tem como objetivo ilustrar as dimensões da 
teoria das Dynamic Capabilities e as suas implicações na vida real. Escolhi a empresa alemã 
Bayer, que, em Junho de 2018, adquiriu a empresa americana Monsanto, para realizar este 
estudo. 
 
Na literatura existente, as aquisições são normalmente definidas como uma ação estratégica, 
usada pelas empresas com o intuito de modificar as suas competências, para que consigam 
acompanhar o ambiente em mudança. O caso em questão, pretende avaliar as razões 
subjacentes à decisão da Bayer de adquirir o fabricante de sementes e analisar quais as 
oportunidades e ameaças que estavam associadas a esta fusão. Além disso, avalia o futuro do 
setor Agrícola e a forma como a consolidação profunda, ocorrida entre 2015-2018, influenciou 
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In 2010, Makri, Hitt and Lane have classified acquisitions as strategic actions which allow 
firms to modify their distinctive competencies in order to keep up with the pace of changes in 
their environment. In their view, acquiring resources, which are difficult to imitate and change, 
serve as a core driver for the engagement in Mergers & Acquisitions. It therefore extends earlier 
research by Perry and Porter (1985) who claimed that a horizontal acquisition’s key motive is 
to create a new, larger organization with more market share, while given the opportunity to 
reduce industry competition.  
Defined as a firm’s ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies to address rapidly changing environments, Dynamic Capabilities can serve as an 
important asset for the successful execution of the acquisition of another firm. Since Teece, 
Pisano, and Shuen published their seminal article in 1997 on the fundamentals of Dynamic 
Capabilities, the topic has gained incremental importance within the managemental literature. 
The new approach arose from the need to complete the Resource-Based Theory for constantly 
changing markets, which was introduced by Barney in 1991. Barreto’s publishing in 2010 
greatly contributed to this framework by classifying Dynamic Capabilities into four 
dimensions, described as “the firm's potential to systematically solve problems, formed by its 
propensity to sense opportunities and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, 
and to change its resource base”. 
 
The identification of motives for the acquisition of another firm has been a central subject of 
interest for corporate management research in the last decades. Accordingly, the following 
dissertation carefully analyzes Bayer’s motivations to take over American giant Monsanto, in 
the largest foreign takeover bid that has ever been completed by a German company, on the 
grounds of the existing theoretical perspectives on mergers and acquisitions. Hereby, it 
enhances several theoretical lenses in order to analyze the benefits and challenges that a highly 
profitable, but risky acquisition can yield. Further, a special emphasis is laid upon the synergies 
that could emerge from this transaction and how it may affect the already highly consolidated 
agricultural industry in the long-run. Additionally, the work was framed to analyze Bayer’s 
Dynamic Capabilities and whether its ability to integrate, construct and reconfigure the given 
competencies had been able to address the firm’s changing environment in an efficient and 
sustainable manner. 
 8 
In the first part, incentives of the above-mentioned acquisition are evaluated, with a special 
focus laid upon the analysis of whether the controversial reputation of Monsanto could be 
compensated by the economically beneficial means and extensive knowledge acquisition of 
the deal. The second part assesses whether agriculture will play a major role in the new 
industrial revolution and how the combination of seeds, pesticides and data analytics is going 
to shape the market in the future. In the following, the development of the agricultural sector 
towards a highly consolidated and regulated market is illustrated, as the fusion had further 
monopolized the seeds and pesticides market. Further, it is evaluated whether the asset 
divestiture of selected Crop Science businesses to competitor BASF may yield evidence of 
acquisition failure. Lastly, in order to create an outlook for the future, the prospects of the 
























2.  Literature Review 
The following section is split into three main topics; aimed to lay the grounds for the analysis 
of Bayer’s acquisition of Monsanto, giving a detailed, critical outline on existing theories and 
frameworks which will further be taken into account to assess the above-mentioned matter.  
Firstly, the review elaborates on the reasons to consider and execute a merger or acquisition 
and which motives serve as the core drivers for companies to practice such a complex decision.  
Secondly, the concept of Dynamic Capabilities is illustrated and which role it plays with 
respect to a takeover, as well as whether its existence is linked to the long-term success of an 
acquisition process. As one dimension of the Dynamic Capability’s framework, the notion of 
reconfiguring a firm’s resource base is assessed and how acquisitions provide means of 
reconfiguring an eternal structure of resources within firms. 
 
2.1) Motivations for Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Despite the current consensus that many M&A transactions are deemed to fail (Angwin, 2007) 
and research claims that in fact, less than 50% actually succeed, the engagement in such 
cooperation’s is yet growing (Calipha, Tarba, and Brock, 2010). In an attempt to understand 
the motives of engaging in M&As, the following abstract gives a comprehensive summary of 
the main points presented in academic literature.  
With the present tendency towards globalization, companies are in need of tightening their 
relations across borders, as for many firms there is no prospect of substantive growth and 
development when solely operating on local markets (Hagedoorn, Duysters, 2002; King, 
Slotegraaf, and Kesner, 2008).  
According to literature, a merger is defined as a consolidation of two or more firms to create a 
new entity, whereby all but one of the enterprises are losing their legal and economic autonomy 
(Walsh, 1989). Acquisitions, however, are defined as the process of one firm taking over 
another. Whilst establishing itself as the new owner of the entity, the acquirer hereby purchases 
either assets or shares of the target firm (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986).  
Acquisitions are often classified as strategic actions which allow firms to modify their 
distinctive competencies in order to keep up with the pace of changes in their environments 
whilst acquiring resources that are difficult to imitate and change (Makri, Hitt, and Lane 2010).  
The authors Makri et al. claim that especially acquisition-deals which are larger than $500 
million tend to be driven by motivations such as market power acquisition and economies of 
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scale, rather than knowledge exchange and accumulation. Strategically, it is common that small 
firms may choose to innovate above average if they have the option to sell out to larger firms, 
while sizable firms rather obtain access to new inventions through acquisitions instead of 
competing in an ‘R&D race’ (Phillips and Zhdanov, 2013).  
Research shows that performing below aspirations increases enterprise’s acquisition activity, 
whilst firms which perform above aspirations usually withdraw from such actions. Hence, 
engagement in acquisitions, defined as “resource-consuming investments which are made to 
improve a firm’s competitive position”, increase with slack and decrease with financial distress 
(Iyer and Miller, 2008).  
Broadly, the goal of a horizontal acquisition is to create a new, larger organization with more 
market share and the opportunity to reduce industry competition (Perry and Porter, 1985). Yet, 
not only the consolidation of market share is a common motive; external growth, vertical 
integration, access to scarce resources, and diversification of risk are amongst the most frequent 
drivers (Calipha, Tarba and Brock, 2010).  
Not only in high-technology industries, but also in a number of others, knowledge is perceived 
as profoundly essential for a long-term success (Hitt, Bierman, and Uhlenbruck, 2006). Related 
to this, Makri, Hitt, and Lane defended in 2010 the claim that complementary scientific, - and 
technological knowledge, both manage to increase performance through stimulation of higher 
quality and an enlarged amount of novel innovations. “Synergies are the present value of the 
net additional cash flow that is generated by a combination of two companies that could not 
have been generated by either company on its own” (Ficery, Herd and, Pursche, 2007).  
Often executives use the existence of synergies to justify big premiums paid during the process 
of an acquisition. A promising motivation is introduced by Ficery et al. in 2007, who finds that 
successful acquirers tend to capture 70-75% of intended synergies within the first year of the 
acquisition, while only a small percentage of companies has to wait longer than three years to 
capture all synergistic benefits. The resulting value of such synergies can be differentiated in 
financial or operating values. Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) support that financial synergies 
are achieved through either the increase of cash flow or the decrease of cost of capital. In 
contrast to that, the greatest source for operating synergetic effects is facilitated through 
economies of scale, greater pricing power, the combination of functional strength as well as 
higher growth in new or existing markets.  
However, given the usual complexity of M&A transactions and the difficulty in assessing their 
results, potential negative outcomes need to be anticipated. When two enterprises merge, they 
seek to minimize uncertainty to a given level of expected profit (Parrino and Harris, 2005). 
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M&A activities tend to be inherently risky, often caused by strong prevailing information 
asymmetries between target and acquirer firm. Hence, the lack of access to crucial data about 
the target firm profoundly increases the M&A’s risk and its anticipated transformation into a 
long-term success (Angwin, 2001).  
 
2.2.) Dynamic Capabilities 
 
2.2.1) Definition of Dynamic Capabilities 
 
With the definition of Dynamic Capabilities by Teece et al., describing them as “the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments” (Teece, Pisano, and Shuen), the concept first gained academic 
relevance through researcher’s attention in 1997. It became apparent that the widely-known 
framework of Porter’s Five Forces (1980); which considers primarily the assessment of 
strategic positioning in a potential industry and how to be best protected from competition; has 
a number of weaknesses with respect to a firm’s changing environment. Based upon potential 
limitations of the framework, the notion of Dynamic Capabilities has considered new 
dimensions in the empirical research within the last two decades, complementing the premise 
of a more resource-based view of a firm, whilst considering tangible and intangible assets 
(Barney, Wright, and Ketchen, 2001). The grounds of the framework were further sustained by 
Zollo and Winter (2002), investigating the mechanisms which assist organizations to develop 
Dynamic Capabilities. The authors declare that such capabilities are achieved through 
routinized activities, which generate systematic operating procedures in order to improve 
performance.  
Hereby, the role of a firm’s experience accumulation, knowledge articulation, and knowledge 
codification is considered, while their coevolution is being perceived as fundamental in the 
process of shaping Dynamic Capabilities. Helfat and Winter (2011) further laid the foundation 
of distinguishing Dynamic Capabilities from common operational capabilities, which are 
directly linked to a firm’s current operation. Helfat et al. differentiate the frameworks by 
defining Dynamic Capabilities as “the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, 
extend, or modify its resource base” (Helfat et al., 2007), actively pointing out that core 
competencies ought to be modified in order to achieve long-term competitive advantages.  
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2.2.2) Fundamentals of Dynamic Capabilities 
 
Although it had been previously cited, the seminal work of Teece, Pisano, and Shuen was the 
first to introduce and defend the Dynamic Capabilities theory as a form of potential source of 
sustainable competitive advantage (1997). In a later publication, it is illustrated that Dynamic 
Capabilities are fundamentally based on a firm’s profoundness of corporate agility. It 
essentially comes down to 1.) the capability to sense and shape opportunities and threats, 2.) 
its ability to seize opportunities and 3.) maintaining competitiveness through enhancement, 
combination, and protection of enterprise’s tangible and intangible assets, which support 
“superior long-run business performance” (Teece, 2007). Predominantly consistent with this 
approach is the definition of Barreto, who stated in 2010 that Dynamic Capabilities are a firm’s 
potential “to systematically solve problems, formed by its propensity to sense opportunities 
and threats, to make timely and market-oriented decisions, and to change its resource base.”  
His perception of essential problem-solving capabilities is hereby connected to the ability to 
sense, shape and seize opportunities (Teece, 2007), as well as the importance of resource-based 
configuration, which was originally introduced by Eisenhardt and Martin in 2000. Hereby, 
research points out that the reconfiguration propensity only achieves high effects when it is 
combined with the propensity to make market-oriented decisions (Menguc & Auh, 2006).  
In 1997 Teece, Pisano, and Shuen initially investigated the fundamental matter of how firms 
sustain relevant competitive advantage under the existence of innovation-based competition, 
performance rivalry and the creative destruction of existing competencies. Their work suggests 
that private wealth creation depends profoundly on the technological, organizational and 
managerial processes inside an enterprise, especially in environments of rapid technological 
change. The authors advocate that simultaneously detecting and embracing new opportunities 
is more crucial in the process of wealth creation than strategic shielding from competition.  
Broadly seen, the theoretical and methodological complexities that are connected to drawing a 
framework around the routines and processes that are required to achieve Dynamic 
Capabilities, have led to conceptual discrepancies. Understanding the relevance and 
contribution of Dynamic Capabilities to competitive advantage, Teece’s framework published 
in 2007 seeks to illustrate that they are “sources of enterprise-level competitive advantage over 
time and provide guidance to managers for avoiding the zero-profit condition”. As this is often 
a result of homogeneous firms competing in perfectly competitive markets, Teece (2007) is 
ultimately linking Dynamic Capabilities to business performance.  
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2.2.3) Fostering and Sustaining Dynamic Capabilities  
 
Teece (2007) states that the deployment of a set of difficult-to-replicate enterprise capabilities 
(processes, activities, and competencies) is required to adapt to changing customer needs, 
technological innovation and increased competitiveness.  
With respect to post-merger management, Zollo and Winter (2002) seek a linkage to Dynamic 
Capabilities, supporting that “the ability to plan and effectively execute post-acquisition 
integration processes is another example of a Dynamic Capability, as it involves the 
modification of operating routines in both, the acquired and the acquiring unit.” As they claim 
that Dynamic Capabilities arise from learning, it is important to note that an environment, 
transformed through a merger, requires an “explicit investment in retrospective sense-making” 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002), in order to ensure that the extension of specific capabilities addresses 
the altered context.  
As Helfat et al. (2007) defend that the competency of purposefully creating, extending or 
modifying a firm’s resource base can be seen as the essence of Dynamic Capabilities, it 
follows that an acquisition can nurture its development through extension.  
Ultimately, collaborations and partnerships can be seen as a source for new-fangled 
organizational learning as it helps firms to recognize dysfunctional routines and prevent 
strategic misconceptualization. Related to learning, theory states (Teece, 2007) that 
constructing strategic assets is another Dynamic Capability. Hence, alliance and acquisition 
routines can enable firms to bring new strategic assets into the firm from external sources 
and facilitate the improvement of existing Dynamic Capabilities, if properly implemented.  
 
Ambrosini and Bowman argued in 2009 that the need for change varies among different 
industries. Generally seen, dynamic environments are often exposed to destabilizing forces, 
namely technological innovation and increasing global competition, which foster both, new 
opportunities and threats. In order to exploit new market possibilities, managers ought to 
effectively manage their organizations and strategies accordingly (Eisenhardt, Furr and 
Bingham, 2010). Hence, particularly fast-changing markets require the development of new 
capabilities and reconfiguration of existing resource bases, strongly relying on the ability to 
reconfigure a firm’s asset structure and accomplish a necessary internal and external 
transformation (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).  
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2.2.4) Reconfiguring Resources and Asset Divestiture 
Firms have multiple ways to attempt change. One is the interorganizational method involving 
an alliance or acquisition, requiring profound interaction with another organization (Capron, 
Mitchell, and Oxley, 1999). Consequently, acquisitions often provide means of reconfiguring 
the structure of resources within the firm. Capron, Mitchell, and Swaminathan defend the 
notion that hereby, asset divestiture is often a logical consequence of this reconfiguration 
process (2001).  
“Business acquisition, resource redeployment, and asset divestiture are elements of a dynamic 
process in which firms change their businesses by recombining internal and external resources” 
(Capron, Mitchell, Swaminathan, 2001).  
Ramaswamy published in 1997 an examination of strategic similarity, stating that a merger 
which is based on parallel strategic characteristics, leads to greater opportunities for scale 
efficiencies compared to those involving two dissimilar firms. While Ramaswamy focusses on 
positive prospects for increasing scale efficiencies, the authors Capron, Mitchell, and 
Swaminathan further defend the hypothesis that the disposition of resource redeployment and 
asset divestiture are often inevitable results of an acquisition (2001). This leads to the proposal 
that “consistent with scale economies rationales, we find that strategic similarity also leads to 
greater asset divestiture from the target firms.” (Capron, Mitchell, Swaminathan, 2001).  
By contrast, Wernerfelt (1984) claims that enterprises evaluate potential target firms with 
respect to their capacity to function as accelerators for further expansion. Despite the dominant 
theories supporting that resource similarities are most common to create value, Wernerfelt 
declares that “acquirers tend to retain target resources that are distinct from the acquirer’s pre-
acquisition resources”. Thus, he endorses that acquirers pursue incremental change by retaining 
resources that are dissimilar, in order to further develop core competencies, Dynamic 
Capabilities, or a more profound competitive advantage. Teece (1986) supports this approach, 
stating that complementary assets, important for an effective commercialization of new 
innovations, are often fostered by distinctive resources amongst the two partners.  
This opens the discussion concerning the logical occurrence of asset divestiture. The economic 
rationale for acquisitions has been deliberately controversial over time, with many theoretical 
perspectives defending that asset divestiture serves as an evidence of acquisition failure 
(Capron, Mitchell, Swaminathan, 2001).  
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Originally, asset divestiture was outlined and pioneered by Ravenscraft and Scherer in 1987, 
defining it as the “partial or complete divestiture of physical and organizational assets, shut 
down of facilities, and reduction of workforces of target or acquirer businesses”.  
Generally seen, there are different motives for the partial disposal of business elements. Under 
certain circumstances it may occur that either existing business units are regarded as being 
redundant after the acquisition of another firm, that the resale value of a firm increases with 
the disposal of a particular business unit, or that a court demands that in order to balance market 
competition, it is required to sale existing business units (Capron, Mitchell, Swaminathan, 
2001). Notably, the existence of redundant assets is more common when both competitive 
environments between target and acquirer firm are much alike, which then often leads to 
immediate benefits through selling such overlapping assets (Anand and Singh, 1997). 
Considering it as a major part of a post-acquisition reconfiguration process, Capron et al. 
(2001) argue that the divestiture of unneeded assets naturally results from the resource 
redeployment between the target and acquirer firm. It contrasts the traditional view that the 
standalone phenomenon of a post-merger sell-off often tends to be connotated negatively 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). The authors Capron et al. thus defend that together, asset 
divestiture and resource deployment represent elements of an “ecological process of business 

















     3. Teaching Case 
3.1) Direction Near-Monopoly? 
 
“Together, these two companies will influence farmers’ opinions and markets all over 
the world on a scale we’ve never seen before.” 1 
–  Evgeniy Kozarenko2 
 
Creating one of the largest global agribusiness companies, the merger of the German, 
multinational pharmaceutical company Bayer and the American seed manufacturer Monsanto 
had brought together two diverse, but highly complementary businesses on the 7th of June 
2018.3 News all around the globe had reported about the megadeal of Bayer, the life science 
company with its core competencies in the fields of health and agriculture, had acquired 
Monsanto, who served as the world’s leading manufacturer of genetically modified seeds. 
Their shared aim had been to develop new ways to improve health with innovative products 
and design an integrated offering with better solutions for the agricultural sector.4  
The deal, valued at $66 billion5, had created one of the global leading agribusinesses in 2018, 
whilst serving as the largest-ever foreign takeover bid by a German company.6 Despite the 
companies’ progressive aspirations of realizing their shared vision to innovatively solve 
scientific challenges and provide better solutions for farmers, there had been a strong global 
opposition regarding the union.  
The merger had been subject of multiple controversial discussions before and after the 
execution, with a number of international environmentalists and politicians voicing their 
discontent regarding the takeover.7 Additionally, it had been critically monitored due to the 
risk of competition concerns by the EU commission. The large all-cash buy-out had been in 
the works since May 2016 and had conclusively received its final approval by the European 
Union in early 2018, closely followed by the Department of Justice’s approval in March, that 
year.8 After Bayer had pledged to sell off additional assets in order to secure the government’s 
antitrust approval, the Justice Department had decided to sign off the megadeal.9 Nonetheless, 
environmentalists all across the globe had embraced the ‘near-monopoly’ in agriculture 
tentatively, as it had appeared to be another step towards the total consolidation of the global 
agricultural market (Exhibit 4.4).10 Together with ChemChina’s $44bn acquisition of Swiss 
Group Syngenta in 2016 and the all-American $130bn formation of DowDuPont in late 201711, 
Bayer’s acquisition had yielded to lay approximately two-thirds of the worldwide seed and 
chemical supply in the hands of only three ventures (Exhibit 4.5).12  
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As of August 2018, Monsanto had officially no longer been known under its 117-year-old 
name13, when Bayer started the formal integration as a subsidiary after becoming the legal 
owner of the U.S. seeds company.14 Yet, the question had remained whether the acquisition 
of a firm such as Monsanto could flourish despite its public standing. The U.S. giant 
had been controversially highlighted in the past for their herbicide glyphosate and their 
genetically modified seeds, which were claimed to promote monocultures and hence 
cycles of dependence in the agricultural industry.15 
"Bayer's public image is better than Monsanto's," a Bayer critical had stated before the 
takeover, "but both companies are carved from the same wood - and when two criminals work 
together, we cannot solve the crime."16 Whether Bayer had been able to sense given 
opportunities correctly, whilst cautiously taking into account potential threats and public 
headwind throughout the execution of the acquisition still needed to be discovered. Meanwhile, 
communities worldwide were debating whether the Bayer-Monsanto merger would use its new 
market position to progressively innovate the agricultural sector, or if the union would proceed 
to solely facilitate unprecedented access to farming data, eventually raising prices for seeds 
and pesticides, whilst creating dependencies for farmers all over the globe.17 
 
 
3.2) One giant acquires the other 
 
“Our combination will accelerate this journey of discovery and advance our 
purpose of science for a better life.”18 
– Werner Baumann19 
 
Up until the acquisition got signed off by the federal authorities, Germany based Bayer 
and St. Louis based Monsanto had long been competing against one another in the fields 
of seed and crop protection products.20 Bayer, the international chemical and 
pharmaceutical enterprise, first set its sails in direction global player in the 1860s, when 
businessman Friedrich Bayer and dyer Johann Friedrich Weskott discovered through 
experimentation how to make dye fuchsine. The “Friedr. Bayer et. comp.” company was 
founded in 1863, masked as a 19th century startup with a promising outlook. When the 
company started engaging in new fields of business between 1881 and 1914, Bayer 
gradually developed into an internationally operating chemical company.21 The 
beginning of the 21st century marked Bayer’s transformation into a 100,000-employee 
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company, widely prominent for their development of modern Aspirin and Alka 
Seltzer.22 However, throughout Bayer’s reformist past, the enterprise stumbled across a 
number of investigations, ranging from their involvement in the manufacturing of 
chemical weapons including chlorine gas, to the scandals around the revolutionary birth control 
pills Yaz and Yasmin.23 Nonetheless, Bayer continued its international growth. In 2014, the 
German global player acquired Land Management assets of DuPont Crop Protection in no less 
than 5 countries, including the United States, Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand, 
allowing the subgroup to take a leading role in Industrial Vegetation Management.24 In May 
2016, Bayer AG welcomed his new CEO, Werner Baumann, who had been a member of the 
Board of Management for the past 6 years, being responsible for the Strategy and Portfolio 
Management. Soon after his placement, Bayer and Monsanto signed their binding merger 
agreement, constructing the legal framework for Monsanto’s acquisition.25  
Monsanto, on the other side, began their journey as an agricultural company after it got 
divested from Pharmacia Corporation in 2002, focusing on innovating yield 
enhancements in order to increase farmer’s profitability.26 In 2002, Monsanto moved 
from sole agricultural biotechnology towards advanced solutions for precision farming, 
realized by the acquisition of companies strategically focused on producing digital tools 
and data mining.27 In the past, Monsanto had to face precarious public headwind due to 
its involvement with genetically modified seeds, which was said to promote 
monocultures and consequentially resulted in farmers involuntarily having an increased 
reliance on chemicals.28 The association of Monsanto with chemicals such as Agent 
Orange, the destructive defoliant used during the Vietnam War29, and especially the 
pesticide Glyphosate, had steadily caused controversial discussions.  
In the course of 2016, the board of Monsanto’s directors had voted to approve the 
acquisition by Bayer CropScience AG, despite originally being opposed to a potential 
takeover. The firm had thought of itself rather as a buyer than as a target. However, 
negotiations with Syngenta and BASF had not flourished and after Bayer had increased 
its bid over months of negotiations30, additionally adding a break-up fee of $3billion, 
Monsanto had settled for the offer.31 Monsanto’s shareholders ended up receiving 





3.3) Agriculture as part of the new industrial revolution 
 
“There is no new dirt,” he said. “We need to get much smarter societally about 
how we farm.” 33 
– Hugh Grant34 
 
It had been both companies’ belief that overcoming the challenge the global world was 
facing would result in a new, reconfigured approach. It would be required to “more 
systematically integrate expertise across Seeds, Traits and Crop Protection including 
Biologicals with a deep commitment to innovation and sustainable agriculture 
practices,” as stated by the head of Crop Science Division, Liam Condon in an interview 
shortly after the acquisition.35 The recently executed combination had brought together both 
companies’ leading innovation capabilities, as well as their R&D technology platforms with a 
substantial shared budget of approximately €2.5 billion.36  
Meanwhile, the CEO of Monsanto had voiced his opinion regarding future ambitions, 
implicating that the two firms would aspire to use data about soil and weather to offer farmers 
a more precise and targeted advise about their choice of seeds and chemicals.37 Grant had stated 
that with Agriculture being a part of the new industrial revolution, successful companies of the 
future had to overcome their focus of solely selling seeds and chemicals, but also required 
incorporating data as a part of the service (Exhibit 4.8). The transformation of the core 
agricultural business focus in those years had provided indicators why Monsanto had acquired 
the Climate Corporation (2013), why it had tried to buy Swiss chemical enterprise Syngenta 
(2015) and why Bayer had initially laid eyes on Monsanto (2016).38 The Climate Corporation 
had been an enterprise which aimed to assist farmers around the world to protect and improve 
their farming operations with the help of uniquely powerful software and insurance products.39  
Above all, the merger had been intimidating to the public due to the profound technological 
developments during those days. Most agricutural companies had recently increased their 
investments in R&D, as it had become apparent that their previous methods of yield 
enhancement through chemicals would no longer work in the foreseeable future. Farmers had 
begun to accept them less and less, resulting from the fact that they had led to species 
loss, water pollution and resistant pests in the past.40  
As the restrictions of the usage of glyphosate had been tightened and neonicotinoids 
were expected to be banned, the corporations found themselves in need of new ideas for 
business growth. Hence, Monsanto, Bayer, and other players had intensively conducted 
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research within the fields of digitized precision farming, a segment, which had used 
sensors to reduce the usage of pesticides and fertilizers. As a result, Bayer and Monsanto 
had planned to invest in the fields of robot testing and development of new genetic 
engineering methods for plant breeding.41 To support this field of innovation, Monsanto 
had acquired numerous start-ups in the years before the acquisition.42  
Together, they had found themselves on the verge of constructing their position as the 
first mover of the new agricultural world.43 The newly formed company had aspired to 
sell everything from one source in the future: seeds, agrochemistry, field data, and 
cultivation knowledge, tailored to each farmer and every square meter of his field (Exhibit 4.8). 
Their aim had been to make the current industrial farming system a little more sustainable and 
a lot more efficient, taking into account the public expectation that, above all, it should not 
drive farmers gradually into a higher dependency of solutions, products, and prices determined 
by large companies.44 
 
 
3.4.) The Facebook of Farming? 
 
“These companies want to make more money, they want to raise prices. No 
company in this industry needs these deals in order to innovate.” 45  
– Mark Connelly46 
 
According to the media and environmentalists, between 2015 and 2018 various mergers in the 
agricultural chemicals and seeds market had marked radical influence on farming and thus had 
reshaped the global food production entirely.47  
Since its first announcement in 2016, discussions had been ongoing regarding underlying 
motives for the next large alliance in the agricultural sector. Publicly, it had been stated that 
Bayer’s main drivers for the acquisition had been to actively benefit from Monsanto’s leading 
position in the fields of seeds and plant traits. Monsanto’s expertise in Digital Agriculture 
trough Climate Corporation had been an interesting asset to complement Bayer’s 
proficiencies.48 Bayer’s main capabilities had been concentrated on Crop Protection product 
lines across a comprehensive range of indications and various crops across each key-
geography. Aspiring to meet current and future needs of their customers, the idea had been to 
produce innovative solutions in the fields of seeds and traits, digital agriculture and crop 
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protection. Both giants had been convinced that efficiency gains, generated by innovative 
solutions in respective areas were to increase the returns for farmers.49  
Brian Carroll, spokesman of Monsanto, who openly defended the movement towards the 
gradual alienation of an oligopoly market structure, pleaded that farmers would merely benefit 
from the mega-deal. In May 2018 he had stated that in current times farmers would “need 
access to tools that support the decisions they make to maximize their return on every acre”, 
which the new union would deliver.50 Both, Bayer and Monsanto, had supported that together, 
they were going to be able to provide better solutions for farmers, whilst developing into a 
leading innovation driver for the next generation of agriculture.51 While the public had 
remained skeptical, the Chief Technological Officer of Monsanto, Robb Fraley, had affirmed 
that the acquisition would help both partners to release resources to increase investments in 
R&D, which consequently would foster a positive effect on global agriculture.52 Conclusively, 
executives of both firms had defended that the consolidation would solely allow for “greater 
efficiency in serving farmers and consumers”, and hence be essentially customer-oriented.53  
 
As of 2019, Bayer would expect a positive contribution from Monsanto to the adjusted earnings 
per share, which would be anticipated to range in the double-digit percentage from 2021 
onwards. From 2022, annual contributions to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) resulting from the deal, had been planned.54 Justifications for the 
acquisition price of $66 billion had been the expected $1.2 billion in cost savings, generated 
from the elimination of overlapping public company expenses, a better positioning while 
negotiating deals with suppliers and through eliminating redundancies (e.g. jobs).55 
However, the time also marked a period for Bayer where the company had been exposed to 
several risks which had been resting on the company’s shoulder. Amongst others, the German 
company had to face a patent cliff from 2023/24 onwards, when a number of patent protections 
of important medicines would start to run out, nurturing the possibility that Bayer would have 
to face future aggressive competition.56 This development had fostered Bayer’s consideration 
of whether the reconfiguration of its resource base would be strategically desirable. 
Nonetheless, the Leverkusen based group had become the undisputed market leader in 
agrochemicals with the acquisition of Monsanto (Exhibit 4.2). Figures of 2017 had stated that 
Bayer’s Division Crop Science managed a turnover of about €21 billion. Through the union, 
the Group would be able to offer the world's largest supply of seeds and the largest volume of 
crop protection products (Exhibit 4.6).57  
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As of 2015, despite declining numbers, the world had yet been confronted with 10% of its 
population having to survive off less than $1.90/day58, translating into 736m people living in 
extreme poverty. 59 These numbers had genuinely underlined Bayer’s and Monsanto’s vision 
to increase efficiency and productivity, depicting their union as a provider of the enormous 
amount of innovation necessary “to double the world’s food supply” (Exhibit 4.7).60 
“Two major concerns we have are: How is this going to affect the prices of products, and how 
is it going to affect the availability of products.”, had reported the federation’s legislative 
affairs director, Spencer Tuma.61 Fears had been amplified as Monsanto had hinted that data 
had been one of the key reasons for the unification. It had promoted increasing concerns that 
progress in this field would eventually allow the agribusiness to exert unprecedented control 
over farmers. The possibility would allow companies to access farmer’s data to sell them seeds 
and pesticides. “The merger will create the biggest platform of its kind ― and give Bayer-
Monsanto a ‘first mover’ advantage similar to Facebook, in the way that it affects 
competitors,” Mute Schimpf, spokeswoman of Friends of the Earth Europe had illustrated.62  
Monsanto's Climate Fieldview data platform, which the company had promoted as "Key 
Growth Driver 2018", had already started to use tractors with sensors, GPS and data drones to 
monitor field conditions and advise farmers in real time. Public voices had argued that the 
combination of seed and data business would allow large corporations to "create proprietary 
platforms that are inaccessible to competition”.63 
 
 
3.5) Fighting Market Regulations 
 
“As Facebook’s algorithms decide which newsfeeds we see, so ‘Baysanto’ will 
decide which pesticides are used, and which seeds are planted.”64 
– Mute Schimpf65 
 
Discussions preceding the acquisition had highlighted different perspectives on the influence 
on the dynamics across the agricultural market. The Guardian had voiced that the union could 
cause major consequences for the seed development, herbicide market, opening research and 
general development processes.66 Bayer and Monsanto believed that hunger in developing and 
emerging countries could only be combated by expanding industrial agriculture. This is what 
the deal stood for, and this was what Monsanto had always been standing for.67  
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It had been recognized quickly that the integration of the two companies would be a real challenge. 
Player A, German Bayer AG, had owned a large portfolio of products, ranging from 
consumer goods like Berocca and Aspirin to pharmaceuticals, crop science and even 
animal health and additionally had enjoyed a genuinely positive reputation up until that 
point. The execution of the mega-deal had tilted Bayer’s business model profoundly 
towards crops and agriculture, indicating an economic potential lying in genetically 
modified high-tech crops, which had originally been developed to feed a growing 
population.68  
Player B, Monsanto, had been considered to be the best plant biotech company at the time. 
However, the firm had experienced a rather appalling image, repeatedly standing in the critics of 
environmentalists and agricultural activists due to its positioning as a pioneer of plant genetic 
engineering.69 Remarkable about Monsanto’s international success had been the fact that it was 
predominantly built upon one product, Roundup, a herbicide brand, which had been the firm’s 
leading product. The herbicide had been controversially discussed as being part of the firm’s 
own circle of dependency. In the past, the US company had sold large quantities of GM-seeds 
for corn, soybeans, cereals and cotton, together with the matching company-owned pesticides 
and herbicides.70 Farmers who worked with Monsanto had usually spread the seeds on huge 
areas of land and nourished the fields with mineral fertilizers, spraying large quantities onto 
the soil.71 The Roundup-Ready crops had been genetically engineered to permit a direct 
application of the Monsanto herbicide glyphosate. The herbicide destroyed all weeds while 
leaving the desired GM-crops unharmed.72 Through this mechanism, Monsanto had ensured 
that farmers ultimately had to rely on their entire portfolio of products, causing a cycle of 
dependence in the long run.  
In Europe, however, and especially in Germany, GM-seeds had been genuinely disapproved 
and in most EU countries cultivation had been prohibited, a matter that had to be considered 
for the unionized enterprise’s shared endeavors.73 The concerns that GM-seeds could 
gradually be introduced in Europe had grown after the deal became public. "We do not 
want to take over Monsanto to establish GM plants in Europe," defended CEO Baumann 
in an interview in 2016. If the legislation would reject GM-seeds, Bayer would accept 
this and had not intended to find other ways to secretly push the implementation.74 Public 
concerns and implications had been voiced regarding the acquisition, but had not been able to 
stop the union, despite its potentially far-reaching effects on price manipulation and market 
power.75 Monsanto, who had started in the 1990s to buy up seed producers around the globe, 
had controlled over a quarter of the world’s commercial seed market in 2015 (Exhibit 4.1).76 
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Similar to the pharmaceutical industry, the agrochemical sector had started to be increasingly 
regulated since the beginning of the 21st century, explaining why, during that time, only big 
vendors had been able to buy and take over more and more business. By way of comparison, 
in 1996 there were still around 600 larger independent seed companies.77 It had been cultivated 
that it could cost billions and take years to get new products approved in the market, which 
only larger firms could compensate.78 National governments and the EU had introduced very 
strict regulations on consumer and environmental protection, occupational health, chemical 
processes and transport of chemicals. This had nurtured the extreme difficulty to strike a 
balance between greater health protection and the cultivation of new innovation. The increasing 
regulations had a restraining effect on innovation activity. Consequentially, innovative 
products had increasingly required large R&D investments. Hence, smaller companies had 
relatively often been worse off since their R&D budgets were typically smaller. Subsequently, 
larger firms frequently had taken over smaller firms which resulted in a decreasing number of 
firms operating in the sector.79  
Especially in the years around 2018, the cost of developing new products had significantly 
increased. Since manufacturers had to consider such regulations, it had caused a suspension in 
the introduction of new products in the market.80 Fraley, CTO of Monsanto, had estimated that 
under the current system, it would take firms approximately a decade to develop and receive 
approval for a new herbicide.81 Then, assuming the success of a product, it would take another 
ten years to create a seed trait which would respond to the new chemical, accordingly. 
Conferring to Fraley, this equation could have been altered through the combination of 
resources of Bayer and Monsanto, allowing them to develop paired products in tandem, 
eventually halving the time it would take to deliver new products to the farmers.82  
 
 
3.6) Why selling to the competitor? 
“No person . . . shall acquire, directly or indirectly, . . . where in any line of commerce or in 
any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition 
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly..”.83 
May 2018 had manifested the landmark for the agricultural sector to face profound changes 
when Bayer had won the approval from the US Justice Department to buy the agricultural giant 
from America.84 There had been a number of legitimate reasons for the authorities to monitor 
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such a substantial consolidation of corporate power, considering the elimination of direct 
competition between two of the biggest players in the ‘traited’ seed market,85 a market which 
had been designed or engineered in order to meet certain qualities that enabled them to be more 
profitable.86  
Since the turn of the millennium, around a quarter of the companies in the plant breeding sector 
had already disappeared, whether as a result of mergers, insolvencies or age-related tasks.87 
During the course of events from Bayer’s initial announcement of the merger until the actual 
execution, the launch of other two rival megadeals involving Dow Chemical, DuPont and 
Syngenta had reinforced the race to consolidation in the respective industry.88 Although the 
two firms, Bayer and Monsanto, had not presented a large overlap in the portfolio of their 
products and customers, the antitrust regulators in Brussels and Washington had participated 
in profound investigations and increased the enforcement of competition rules.89 
Throughout early 2018, it had become apparent that Bayer had to agree to divestiture certain 
business units as part of the planned acquisition of the American competitor. Opponent BASF 
had been deliberated to be the big beneficiary of the Bayer-Monsanto antitrust lawsuit, as all 
business units that Bayer had surrendered at the request of the competition guardian had gone 
to the Ludwigshafen Group. Bayer had contracted with BASF the sale of a package, covering 
the vegetable seed business, certain seed treatment products, trademarks for key row crops in 
select markets, the R&D platform for wheat hybrids and certain glyphosate-based weed killers 
(herbicides) in Europe.90 Additionally, the transfer of research projects in the area of ‘total 
herbicides’ and digital farming had been added.91 
“This strategic move adds excellent assets to our strong agricultural solutions portfolio and 
enhances our innovation potential.”, reported Chairman and CTO of BASF, Martin 
Brudermüller after the final execution of the deal in August 2018.92 All in all, the purchase 
price for the assets with a sales volume of €2.2 billion had been €7.6 billion and had marked 
BASF’s largest takeover in the Group’s history.93 Together with the delivery of these 
businesses, around 2,500 employees had been transferred from Bayer to BASF. Bayer had 
intended to use the proceeds to partially refinance the following $66 billion following the 
acquisition of Monsanto.94  
The question had remained to which extent the divestiture of the named business units had 
harmed Bayer’s standing in the global market, as the antitrust agents had caused to transform 
BASF into a strong competitor in agrochemicals. Up until that time, the group had no seeds in 
their portfolio, but only pesticides (Exhibit 4.1). The acquisition of the entire Bayer crop 
protection business profoundly changed not only BASF’s but also Bayer’s resource base, as 
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figures illustrated that BASF's agrochemicals would now have generated sales of €7.7 billion.95 
“Without the agreed-to divestitures, the proposed merger would likely result in higher prices, 
lower quality and fewer choices across a wide array of seed and crop protection products”, 
the Department of Justice (DoJ) had stated.96 Decisively, the U.S. DoJ had accepted the step as 
sufficient to prevent Bayer-Monsanto from becoming too dominant in any of the markets of 
the merged entity.97 However, despite the attempt to even out monopoly threats, the acquisition 
had caused the four major providers to dominate more than 70% of the agrochemical industry, 
ultimately competing with the same business model: the combination of seeds and crop 
protection to a complete package.98 
 
 
3.7) Meeting the challenges of tomorrow 
 
“Whoever secures genetic material through patents will control the seed sector and will 
influence agriculture, food production – and ultimately world food security.”99 
–  Heinrich Böll Stiftung 
 
Monday, the 13th of August 2018, had marked a turning point in the post-merger development 
of the recent acquisition: The share price of Bayer had dropped significantly. Earlier that day, 
the share chart had shown a drop of around eight percent in the share price of Bayer, shortly 
thereafter, it had fallen even further and at 9.45pm, it had noted a drop of 13% in total.100  
The series of events had been the result of an US court sentencing the subsidiary Monsanto to 
$290 million of compensation - to a single claimant. The awarded compensation went to a 
plaintiff who had alleged that his cancer had resulted from numerous years of using Roundup, 
Monsanto’s popular herbicide.101 From the point of view of the US jury, the agrarian group 
had failed to warn about the cancer risk of the herbicide glyphosate.102 Regardless of knowing 
whether the accusations had been correct, it had been likely to weigh heavily on Bayer’s stock 
price due to the uncertainty of the circumstances, analyst Michael Leacock had stated.103 The 
effects on the share price had denoted that the long-planned acquisition had in fact, exposed 
the German group to significant legal and reputational risk.104 Throughout the third quarter of 
2018, e-mails had been made public suggesting that the company had been informed about the 
health hazards of their bestseller glyphosate and had knowingly covered them up. Thousands 
of cancer victims in the US had sued Monsanto, blaming glyphosate as the cause of their illness. 
Monsanto had done their utmost to deny a connection.105 
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Additionally, American farmers had started to claim compensation, blaming Monsanto's new 
products for crop losses. Monsanto had announced immediately to appeal against the verdict. 
The products have had "a 40-year history of safe use" and would continue to be an "important, 
effective and secure tool" for users, a spokesman of the company had stated in an interview.106 
Looking back into the American past, it hadn’t been uncommon for penalties to be significantly 
reduced in the case of certain proceedings in their final instance or that sentences had been 
revoked altogether.107  
Nevertheless, the Bayer share had crashed after the verdict, consequentially loosing up to €15 
billion in market capitalization. Investors had feared gigantic demands from other glyphosate 
proceedings - after all, around 8,000 similar lawsuits had yet been pending. Some analysts had 
considered the risks for the Group and thus its shareholders as high, as the very first judgement 
in the corresponding process had served as a signal effect.108 
But there had been other uncertainties and allegations that the recent union had to face 
during the course of late 2018, as the Leverkusen-based company suddenly found itself 
in the shooting point of the public. Bayer, who from a reputational point of view had 
enjoyed an overall positive standing, had to fight various accusations of exploitive and 
monopolistic aspirations in the already vastly concentrated market.109 For many Bayer 
employees, the situation had been unfamiliar and irritating.110  
 
Together, Bayer and Monsanto had represented the pinnacle of data-driven industrial 
agriculture, as they marked the significant culmination of a whole series of corporate 
mergers throughout those years.111 Concerns had been publicly displayed regarding the 
fact that the merger had fostered a huge concentration of the market, focusing on the 
development- and sales of commonly used seeds, involving traited strains of canola, 
soybeans, and corn. Additionally, it had increased Monsanto’s control over areas where 
it had already been a dominant player, including fertilizers, pesticides and farming 
technology.112 Generally speaking, there was nothing wrong with that. However, critical 
opinions had voiced their concerns that if the union would proceed to bundle appointed 
products together, it would leave farmers with fewer alternative options, eventually 
pushing up prices. This would ultimately lead to the threat of the abundance of non-
biotechnology choices, and hence gradually lowering the margins of the market.113 Here 
is where especially small, family owned farms would be affected, as price increases 
would potentially force them into selling out to larger agribusiness operators who could 
bear greater expenses. Public voices had painted a dystopian picture of the post-
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acquisition: one with bigger and fewer farms, livestock operations, grain, seed and 
pesticide companies; and one where farms would have a hard time to operate sustainably 
and profitably under the control of gigantic companies due to the limited choices of 
suppliers.114 Despite Bayer’s promise to not further engage in GM-development, 
environmentalists had prompted their apprehensions about the lowering impact on 
biodiversity, as the, now three large corporations, would prospectively further promote 
genetically modified seeds, as well as the pesticides and herbicides, which assist to 
make them more effective.115  
These concerns had been backed up by studies from the Farmers Business Network, 
which had represented a positive correlation between a company’s market share and its 
seed price. If the potential fears would find its way into reality, umpteen products such 
as gasoline, which hide corn and soybeans as ingredients, would be subject to price 
controls and potential increases as well.116 Hence, in the long run, a change in the 
agricultural sector could directly affect price mechanisms across other industries, as 
various raw materials for industrial productions are sourced from agriculture.117  
 
The 21st of August had marked "Day One", as it was called internally, the official 
starting signal for the integration of the US company. CEO Baumann had fertilized his 
speech with superlatives: together they would want to form the best and most innovative 
company in agriculture. At the same time, the Bayer CEO had urged his employees to 
take ethical responsibility, as Bayer's agribusiness had also aspired to become a leader 
in terms of sustainability and transparency.118 
Nonetheless, the question had been lingering in the room: Had Bayer underestimated what had 
been purchased in terms of new legal risks from Monsanto? Was the acquisition really a good 
idea? Or had the Bayer management succumbed to its own longing for greatness and put the 
future of the traditional German company at risk for it?119 
 
As the year of 2018 had come towards its end, the controversial discussions regarding 
the union had gradually moved in the background, yet without public voices coming to 
a clear positioning of support or fright. However, communities had agreed that through 
a reconfiguration of the agricultural sector, the entire world would successively be 
affected. The consolidation of the market had once again emphasized that agriculture 
forms the base of sustenance for any economy and that adversity in this market would 
have major implications on multiple other industries.120 
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4. Exhibits  
4.1. “Big 6“ global market share of pesticides and seeds before the merger & acquisition 





4.2 “Big 6” global market share in the combined seeds and pesticides market before the 
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5. Teaching Notes 
A. Synopsis 
 
This teaching case focusses on the motives for the acquisition of US-giant Monsanto by 
Germany-based Bayer in 2018. It demonstrates an example of a company’s strategic change 
through the acquisition of a competitor, and how it can support a firm to manage the benefits 
and threats associated with changing environments. The case further paints a picture of whether 
the horizontal acquisition of Monsanto had provided means of reconfiguring the structure of 
Bayer’s resource base and to which extent Bayer had been able to utilize its Dynamic 
Capabilities. The case allows the reader to clearly understand how the largest German 
acquisition had significantly intensified an already profoundly consolidated market. Lastly, it 
gives an outlook on which impact this may have on global society in general and on the 
agricultural sector in particular.  
The introduction part of the case silhouettes the environment in which the acquisition had taken 
place and describes the journey from its initial announcement to the final execution of the deal.  
It is aiming to shape an outline of the legal aspects of the arrangement and how it was assessed 
by the public. It further illustrates how, together with the mergers of ChemChina and Syngenta 
and the unification of DowDuPont, Bayer’s acquisition had caused to lay approximately 70% 
of the worldwide seed and chemical supply in the hands of only three enterprises. Lastly, it 
describes the challenges of the agricultural industry, based on the outlook of an increasing 
world population. 
The following two parts introduce the partners, their history and journey towards operating as 
two large, competitive global players. It lays the focus on their products lines and main fields 
of expertise, but also on the challenges and scandals they had been facing in the past. It further 
paints a picture of the agricultural sector at the time and its propensity to be part of a new 
industrial revolution.  
The fourth chapter of the case elaborates the underlying motives which served as main drivers 
for Bayer to practice such a complex decision and indicates how the new market leader in 
agrochemicals was aspiring to use its strong position in the market.  
This is followed by the 5th chapter, which illustrates the market regulations which the 
agrochemical sector were exposed to at the time of the acquisition, and illustrates how 
increasing R&D power can serve as a great advantage in a highly regulated market.  
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This leads to a detailed description of the competition concerns, voiced by the Department of 
Justice, subsequently explaining why Bayer decided to agree to divestiture in certain business 
units to competitor BASF and which consequences this may have.  
To conclude the case, a special focus is laid upon the analysis of whether the negative 
reputation of Monsanto can be compensated by the economically beneficial means of the 
acquisition. The final part highlights the effect that the development towards a quasi-monopoly 
may have on customers and society and whether the newly formed company will use its 
strength and market share to fight the challenge of an increasingly populated world with a 
steadily growing demand for food. 
 
B. Teaching objectives 
 
This case was designed to be introduced to both, under- and post-graduate students in the fields 
of strategic management, particularly for classes on Corporate Strategies and Mergers & 
Acquisition. The teaching case focusses primarily on the analysis of motives for large 
acquisitions and how the consolidation of an industry can seriously affect its environment in 
the broader sense.  
It may further be used to illustrate how the takeover of another firm requires the ability to 
change one’s resource base in the process. With the help of the case, students should be able 
to conduct a thorough analysis of the past- and present standing of an enterprise in a certain 
market and which impact a horizontal acquisition can have on this. The case was framed to 
evaluate Bayer’s Dynamic Capabilities and whether its ability to integrate, construct and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies would aid a successful acquisition process. 
Further, students should assess incentives for the acquisition from the perspective of both firms, 
with a special focus laid upon the analysis of whether the negative reputation of Monsanto 
could be compensated by the economically beneficial means and market share gains of the 
acquisition. With the assistance of several theoretical lenses, students may be able to evaluate 
the benefits and challenges that a highly profitable, but risky union can yield and assess Bayer’s 
and Monsanto’s motivations accordingly.  
Above all, graduate students should be able to grasp the outcomes that can result from such a 
profound market consolidation, whilst the case should assist to foster their critical assessment 




C. Intended contribution  
 
This case intends to demonstrate the importance of strategic change for a company and how 
essentially, the acquisition of an opponent can serve as an effective tool to cope with changing 
environments. The case’s focal contribution is to elaborate how Bayer’s strategic decision to 
acquire competitor Monsanto had affected its own firm internally and externally, and how it 
further impacts the industry in the long-run. The Bayer- and Monsanto case intends to illustrate 
the topic of Dynamic Capabilities and, in particular, the importance of their correct application 
in the course of a successful acquisition process. It intends to draw a thorough picture of the 
course of events and the effects it had on all stakeholders involved in the deal. It was framed 
to further allow students to critically review the execution of a large horizontal acquisition with 
all its dimensions and how a firm’s reconfiguration may impact an entire industry.  
 
D. Pedagogical overview 
 
In order to effectively analyze and discuss the teaching case, lecturers and students should aim 
to invest in a thorough preparation in advance. Hereby, a graduate student’s elementary 
knowledge concerning strategic management, strategic change, and the assessment of firm’s 
performance is assumed. It is recommended that both, students and lecturer, have made 
themselves familiar with the concept of “Dynamic Capabilities: Understanding Strategic 
Change in Organizations” (2007) by Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece and 
Winter. This serves as an extension to the perspective on “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management” published by Teece et. al (1997), which is amongst the recommended journals 
which strengthen the qualifications to fully apprehend the matters examined in the Literature 
Review. Lastly, as the framework is crucial for the given tasks, a certain level of familiarity 
with Barreto’s “Dynamic Capabilities: A Review of Past Research and an Agenda for the 
Future” (2010), is recommended.  
A general understanding of the agricultural sector, its past development, as well as its future 
prospects could be supportive in order to fully grasp the dimensions that the teaching case 
builds upon. However, it is not necessary for the instructor, or the students, to have acquired 
extensive knowledge regarding genetically modified seeds, pesticides and other wide-ranging 
information about crops, in advance. Instead, it is important for students to possess a general 
understanding of Mergers and Acquisitions and which motives serve as main drivers for such 
complex decisions. Additionally, they should be able to identify the potential impact that 
extensive market consolidation can have on a certain industry and how to identify threats and 
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benefits in a given environment. Especially for the final discussion, it is recommended for 
participants to have a broad understanding about the intentions of different stakeholders in the 
given environment and how the matters of market regulations and competition-elimination 
shape the long-term success of acquisitions.  
 
E. Assignment questions 
 
1a.) After carefully reading the case, please investigate to which extent Bayer possesses 
Dynamic Capabilities and in which way they are applied in the given acquisition-process? 
 
Students are asked to apply the framework of Barreto, focusing on his four dimensions of 
Dynamic Capabilities. They should further operate with the approach of Helfat et al., 
conceptualizing DC as “the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, or 
modify its resource base”. With the given background, students should carefully investigate 
the case and analyze each DC propensity individually with respect to Bayer’s positioning.  
 
D1: Propensity to sense opportunities and threats  
• Bayer understood that Monsanto as a potential acquisition-target strikes with its 
profoundly complementary business positioning; 
• Sensed the opportunity of Monsanto having their core competencies resituated in the 
fields of seed manufacturing, instead of healthcare and pesticides;  
• Recognized the challenges the planet is facing with respect to an increasing world 
population, understood the need to increase efficiency amongst the food production in 
order to secure feeding of an additional 3 billion people;  
• Recognized early the potential reputation-threats and hence, the abundance of 
Monsanto’s name to avoid probable damage; 
• Sensed the extensive sector-transformation from 2015-2018 due to the gradual 
consolidation of the market – together with DowDuPont’s and ChemChina’s increased 
market share the two firms would have a radical influence on the future pathways. 
 
D2: Propensity to make timely decisions  
• Considering that negotiations of the acquisition-deal had started in 2016, Bayer realized 
early on that it was time to unionize with another large opponent;  
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• Realized that still, 10% of the world population was living in extreme poverty – sensing 
that the time was right to fight this with increasing R&D investments to generate 
innovations tackling the challenge; 
• Understood that their previous methods of yield enhancement through chemicals would 
be unlikely to work in the foreseeable future, as farmers had embarked to accept 
them less and less. 
 
D3: Propensity to make market-oriented decisions  
• Bayer carefully examined the development of the market for agricultural chemicals and 
understood that the market for seeds and pesticides was undergoing a profound change; 
• Bayer eliminated one of its main competitors by acquiring Monsanto;  
• Understood that the sector had been at the verge of combining conventional agricultural 
with soil– and weather data analysis;  
• Managed to take advantage of Monsanto already having acquired weather company 
Climate Corporation for its aspirations to use data about soil and weather; 
• Offered the world’s largest supply of seeds and volume of crop protection products; 
• Grasped that the usage of glyphosate had been tightened and that hence, the 
corporations had been in the need of new ideas for business. 
 
D4: Propensity to change the resource base  
• Acquired Monsanto to benefit from its expertise across Seeds, Traits and Crop 
Protection; 
• Divested in assets of well-operating business unit to competitor BASF and offered of 
an additional break-up fee of $3bn; 
• Pledged to sell off additional assets to secure the government’s antitrust approval; 
• Restructured internally, e.g. employees being sent to BASF, business model 
combination whilst protecting Bayer’s tangible and intangible assets; 
• Showed willingness to tilt core business strategy towards more data focused business 
strategy; 
• Incorporated Monsanto’s highly complementary expertise in the fields of high-tech, 




1b.) Rate each Dimension on a level from low – medium – high. 




 2.) Carefully examine the case to investigate Bayer’s motives for the acquisition of 
Monsanto and elaborate whether these were sufficient enough to execute the deal.  
 
The case was structured to paint a picture of the business environment in which Bayer had been 
resituated at the point of the acquisition. Students are supposed to carefully examine motives 
of the deal and further weigh out the benefits and threats which had been connected to the 
acquisition process. It seems to be evident that main drivers for the acquisition had 
predominantly been economically beneficial means and market share gains. The merger had 
made the two firms the undisputed market leader in agrochemicals, allowing Bayer to be the 
world’s leading supplier of seeds and offer the largest volume of crop protection products. 
Hence, a motive that can be clearly identified and also is amongst the common goals stated in 
literature, is that horizontal acquisitions are usually aimed to create a new, larger organization 
with more market share and the opportunity to reduce industry competition. This had evidently 
been the case in Bayer’s environment. The increasing competition in the agricultural sector had 
been nurtured through the consolidation of the market and had increased Bayer’s growing 
interest in market share acquisition. Additionally, a driver had been the opportunity to have an 
increased R&D budget for the upcoming years and hence, a stronger possibility to focus on 
innovations fostering to increase efficiency in the food production. Hand in hand with this 
motivation goes the strategic acquisition of capabilities to diversify the potential sources of 
sustainable competitive advantage for both firms. Bayer had sensed the opportunity to benefit 
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from Monsanto’s expertise in the fields of Seeds, Traits, and Crop Protection. The German 
company had realized that there had been strong economic potentials resided in the fields of 
high-tech, - and genetically modified crops. Both firms had believed that agriculture would 
play a large role in the new industrial revolution and that a prosperous company would have to 
combine offering seeds, chemicals, and data analysis as part of a successful service. This is 
coherent with what is stated in literature, as complementary scientific, - and technological 
knowledge is supposed to increase performance through the stimulation of higher quality- and 
a larger number of novel innovations. Another motive that had spoken for acquiring Monsanto, 
is that the firm had already extended its expertise towards data– and weather analysis services, 
serving as interesting assets to complement Bayer’s proficiencies. Considering that with one 
deal, Bayer had not only grasped the opportunity to compensate its missing assortment in the 
fields of seed manufacturing but also acquire valuable expertise with respect to data 
acquisition. The acquisition of these complementary properties would support approaching the 
anticipated fundamental pillars of agriculture in the future: a great portfolio of seed varieties, 
coupled with specific plant protection and tailored data analysis.  
During the analysis, participants are required to consider that the success-rates for M&A’s are 
highly ambivalent and that especially larger deals are inherently risky. Especially prevailing 
information asymmetries between target - and acquirer firm can cause a lack of access to crucial 
data. Another important determinant of M&As success is whether there is the right balance 
between autonomy and integration. In the given case, it is important to consider that Monsanto 
had generated controversial publicity in the past and that through a horizontal acquisition this 
may cause a negative impact on Bayer’s reputation. Students may point out the external risks 
which could have altered acquisition-motives, such as Monsanto’s damaged image due to the 
production of Agent Orange, the introduction of ‘total herbicide’ Roundup and the 
manufacturing of GM-seeds. Optionally, they can point out the upcoming threat of multiple 
pending law-suits resting on Bayer’s shoulders. Students are required to note that the asset 
divestiture to opponent BASF could be considered as a trade-off with diminishing effects on 
the increased post-acquisition turnover. Monsanto had always seen itself rather as a buyer than 
as a target, thus it can be pointed out that another driver had been to ensure to acquire the large 
competitor before Monsanto could potentially merge with another opponent. Above all, the 
knowledge- and expertise acquisition seems to have served as the inherent driver, as in a highly 
consolidated- and regulated market such as the agrochemical one, increased R&D budget and 
faster product development would eventually halve the time to deliver new products to the 
farmers and increase the turnover accordingly.  
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3.) Discuss whether you believe that the development towards a near-monopoly in the 
agricultural sector may introduce threats to the world or not.  
 
The case was purposely designed to activate an independent process of student’s weighing out 
potential benefits and threats of the described development in the years around 2018. It is 
important that students have the possibility and time granted to carefully form an opinion and 
position themselves in the debate. This should be based on facts they have taken away from 
the case, the additional research they have conducted and their knowledge of the theoretical 
background. Especially throughout the last chapter, the case elaborates potential pathways that 
the market consolidation might follow in future years and which outcomes this could trigger. 
The teaching case deliberately does not end in a call for action but rather in an open-ended 
question of how the described development might shape the future of the agricultural sector 
and its impact on other industries. However, students are asked to critically review the chain 
of causation mentioned in the case. Namely, that through the multiplier effect on other 
industries, food price inflation will eventually cause other commodity prices to increase, which 
will result in the agricultural sector affecting price mechanisms across various other industries. 
The discussion may be led in different directions, either focusing on the assessment of the Anti-
Monopoly offices, on the future of genetically modified seeds or an increasingly data-driven 
agricultural market. Students are asked to put things into perspective and highlight the situation 
from different points of view, and further visualize a global outlook for the future.  
 
F.  Board plan 
 The table below suggests a potential schedule designed for a 90 minutes lecture. It shows the 





My dissertation focusses primarily on the concept of Dynamic Capabilities and the strategic 
motives for the acquisition of another company, exemplified by a real-life case. For this study, 
I have chosen the case of Bayer and Monsanto, as an illustration of a horizontal acquisition, 
which has provided means of reconfiguring the structure of both enterprises. One main 
objective of the case is to emphasize the relevance and applicability of the Dynamic 
Capabilities view in a real-life context and how it has helped Bayer to successfully execute 
such a transition. 
Ever since Teece, Pisano, and Shuen published their seminal article in 1997 on the 
fundamentals of Dynamic Capabilities, the topic gained incremental importance within the 
management literature. The authors define such as the firm’s ability to integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address quickly changing environments. In 
our global world, it has become apparent that the frequency of such changing business 
environments has increased through the significant impact of rapid technology- and societal 
changes. Hence, the given case was chosen to exemplify the importance for managers to 
carefully analyze the environment in which they are operating, especially before making the 
complex decision of pursuing an acquisition target. Also, the crucial importance of a cautiously 
conducted due diligence analysis is illustrated in the case and how public opinion should be 
considered carefully to anticipate potential opportunities and threats. The case demonstrates 
that Bayer had proved that its propensity to make market-oriented decisions had been 
satisfyingly high, as well as the precise timely manner in which the acquisition was executed, 
two dimensions which often are intertwined. However, Barreto (2010) and Teece at al. (1997) 
state the profound importance to sense and shape opportunities and threats correctly, in order 
to ensure a superior long run business performance. Hence, it remains debatable whether 
Bayer’s propensity to carefully consider all potential threats would, in the long run, pose a risk 
to a stable and successful development of the recently unionized firm.  
According to the authors Makri, Hitt, and Lane (2010) especially large acquisition-deals which 
are priced at over $500 million tend to be driven by motives including market-power-
acquisition and economies of scale, rather than knowledge exchange- and accumulation. In the 
particular case, however, it becomes apparent that at least the publicly stated motives had 
knowledge exchange as a core driver. Hence, the given case contradicts what has been 
identified as commonly acknowledged motives in existing literature. 
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The pursuit of complementary knowledge is supported by Hitt et. al.’s (2006) position that not 
only in high-technology industries but also in a number of others, knowledge is perceived as 
profoundly essential to secure long-term success. The given case is in line with this position, 
as the fact that the firm’s assets were vastly complementary fostered the high economic 
potential which Bayer sensed in high-tech and GM crops. Further, through their distinctive 
knowledge and core businesses, as a union, they were able to offer the world’s largest supply 
of seeds and volume of crop protection products. This strategic move is consistent with Makri, 
Hitt, and Lane’s (2010) claim that complementary scientific, - and technological knowledge, 
both manage to increase the performance in terms of innovation-power through stimulation of 
higher quality and an enlarged amount of novel inventions.  
Due to the fact that the market is highly regulated, the specific focus on knowledge-acquisition 
gains a special importance in the sector of agrochemicals and seeds, as well as Monsanto’s 
expertise with respect to precision farming. Considering the regulatory constraints of the 
industry, the rising consolidation of the market becomes more plausible. Bayer and Monsanto’s 
main aspiration to exchange and expand their accumulated knowledge thus increases in 
importance. The conclusion of the given motives for the acquisition are underlined by the 
findings of Philips and Zhdanov (2013). According to them, small firms are aiming to innovate 
above average if they have the option to sell out to larger firms, while sizable firms aim to 
obtain access to new inventions through acquisitions, instead of competing in an ‘R&D race’. 
Hence, this seems coherent with Makri, Hitt and Lane’s (2010) claim that acquisitions allow 
firms to modify their distinctive competencies in order to keep up with the pace of changes in 
their environments. Bayer, as a large competitor in the industry, had the market- and financial 
power to obtain appointed access to new inventions, and thus acquired resources that are 
difficult to imitate and change from Monsanto, instead of competing in the ‘R&D race’. 
Although this is coherent with the findings in literature, it is important to note that despite the 
logical occurrence of the acquisition, the union of Monsanto and Bayer perfected a business 
model which might have the effect of driving globalized agriculture into a deeper circle of 
dependence, created by the appointed combination of power, knowledge, and resources. 
Another interesting matter which is discussed in the thesis is the aspect of asset divestiture. 
The theoretical perspectives on this topic gauge whether the special case of asset divestiture 
yields evidence of acquisition failure. Bayer’s agreement to sell selected Crop Science 
businesses for a total consideration of €7.6bn to competitor BASF had a unique underlying 
motive, as it was solely executed in order to obviate the potential regulatory concerns of the 
acquisition. The existence of redundant assets is more common when both competitive 
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environments between target and acquirer firm are much alike. According to literature, selling 
such overlapping assets to the competitor often leads to immediate benefits (Anand and Singh, 
1997). In the given case, the significant business unit divestiture to competitor BASF does not 
seem to have carried such immediate benefits, besides serving as a sufficient antitrust remedy. 
Usually, literature states that as part of the post-acquisition reconfiguration process, the 
divestiture of unneeded assets naturally results from the resource redeployment between the 
target and acquirer firm. In this case, however, the business unit that was sold to BASF served 
as a profoundly strengthening asset to the competitor and can thus be evaluated as a harmful 
consequence, rather than a natural and beneficial occurrence to Bayer.  
It is interesting to note that there has been hardly any academic research conducted with respect 
to the type of asset divestiture, which two merging partners feel obliged to agree to, in case a 
government authority objects to a deal on antitrust grounds. It is an emerging strategy to seek 
a compromise where one - or both merging parties agree to assemble and divest a package of 
assets to a third party, as a condition of proceeding with the transaction. Hereby, the 
government's objective with any negotiated divestitures is to reinstall the competition that 
would otherwise be eliminated by the transaction itself. It would be interesting to have an 
outlook on whether divestiture can actually serve as a viable antitrust remedy. It is supposed to 
alleviate the interest of the government and other involved companies, as consecutively the 
two partners would get clearance to merge or acquire one another while maintaining 
competition. To extent academic research on the benefits and threats to all the stakeholders 
involved in such a process could be a great advancement to the research of large M&A deals.  
 
Ficery et al. introduced in 2007 the concept that successful acquirers tend to capture 70-75% 
of intended synergies within the first year of the acquisition, while only a small percentage of 
companies have to wait longer than three years to capture all synergistic benefits. Regarding 
the measurement of the intended capturing of such synergies, there are some limitations present 
due to potential changes, which often are not visible in the short-term. The full integration of 
an acquired target takes time and hence, many internal and external changes are often only 
assessable in the long-run. Linking the evaluation of synergy-capturing to the given occurrence 
of asset divestiture, the evaluation of how this will benefit or harm the market positioning of 
Bayer and competitor BASF can only be thoroughly determined in the long-run. To which 
extent and within which time frame the enterprise will be able to capture intended synergies 





The concept of Dynamic Capabilities has received significant attention in recent years within 
the fields of strategic management, explaining how a company’s ability to integrate, build and 
reconfigure competencies helps to address rapidly changing environments. Barreto’s definition 
revealed the necessary coherence and aggregation to the initial theory posed by Teece, fostering 
a path for further theoretical and empirical investigations. Serving as one of the most relevant 
management theories developed in recent years, this dissertation applies the given concept on 
a real-life example. For my study ‘Bayer and Monsanto – Seeding the future?’, I have chosen 
Bayer’s large acquisition in 2018, as it focusses on a recent and important matter, while the 
size of two such large enterprises represents the profound impact their decision making has on 
an industry. Additionally, the thesis enhances several theoretical lenses in order to analyze the 
opportunities and challenges that a complex acquisition like this can yield and carefully 
assesses Bayer’s motivation accordingly.  
The Bayer and Monsanto case exemplifies how such a strategic decision requires to be 
carefully assessed on various dimensions, and to which extent the possession of sufficient 
Dynamic Capabilities was fundamental for the acquisition process. It further illustrates the 
special importance of Barreto’s first dimension, as the case shows that Bayer’s propensity to 
carefully sense potential opportunities and threats may pose a profound impact on the future 
success of the entity.  
The thesis evaluates how the horizontal acquisition provided means of reconfiguring Bayer’s 
resource structure and illustrates the company’s successful ability to purposefully create, 
extend, or modify its resource base in the given process. It demonstrates that asset divestiture 
does not necessarily yield evidence of acquisition failure, but that it may substantially pose a 
threat to the long-term success of a new entity. However, the question of whether negative 
reputation of Monsanto will be compensated by the economically beneficial means and market 
share gains of the acquisition will only be assessable in the future.  
 
From this work, I was able to deepen my knowledge about the Agrochemical market in general, 
and the underlying reasons for the increasing consolidation of the market in particular. I further 
established awareness of core motives for an acquisition and how Dynamic Capabilities can 
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